Military Options Against WMD Proliferation

I. Introduction

A lot has been written about what one could do militarily when confronted with a country striving for WMDs. I, too, am guilty of having contributed to the literature on this theme (Jane's International Defence Revue, November 1995). This analysis will consider all the main categories, NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical). Since an actual military attack with subsequent occupation of the suspect country is usually not an alternative, we will restrict our discussion to an action at a distance option, i. e. aerial and/or ballistic attacks by various weapon systems. Facilities on the surface can be easily destroyed through manned/unmanned aerial attacks. But recent cases have shown that the possible adversaries have learned the lesson of the years passed and placed most of their suspected activities systematically below ground, dispersed in, perhaps, heavily armored bunkers. Deeply buried and dispersed facilities are the great challenge and threat. Much has been published about the prowess of the American bunker busters, but not all PR and spin is necessarily reality. The recent American Iraq “experience” is a case in point. Due to a lack of really hard intelligence as to the location, depth and strength of Saddam's bunkers, many sites attacked proved to be duds, no bunkers. In addition, although the Americans constantly bubble about “surgical strikes”, their penchant for “some is good, much more is much better”, made these strikes look like a Texas Chainsaw operation. Fortunately for us, most of the these buried proliferation facilities are in secluded areas, due to the extreme security requirement and secrecy problem. This means that satellite intelligence, taken over many years, can give us a fairly good idea of the extent and other properties of the bunkers. Even in the case of tunneling into mountains we are not completely blind. By keeping track of the amount of material brought out of the tunnel and the properties of the material itself, i. e. soil/rock, the geological lay of the area (layers and strata) gives hints about depth and location. Depending upon the soil humidity even ground penetrating radar comes into question. Some of the candidate sites are actually in some very arid areas, enabling us to use radar.

The main discussion will consists of four main parts. First, the targets classified according to the basic geological properties of the area in which the facility is buried. This is followed by a quick look at the general weapon systems considering first their “delivery” possibilities, i. e. can they deposit the warhead accurately into the target. Then we consider the possible warheads, orthodox and otherwise, that could come into play in attempting to defeat these facilities. Lastly, we consider several scenarios matching all four factors together into an operative targeting plan.

II. Intel and Targets

Most countries suspected of nuclear weapon activity, have been systematically burying their facilities underground in harden bunkers or digging into mountain massifs. While satellite and aerial fly overs (manned or unmanned) can keep track of this sites (once discovered – and using photo archives) during their construction phase. But even then, one stills needs “gumshoes on the ground” to fill in the gaps of our current knowledge. Infiltration units will be needed for a variety of missions, just to name a few, 24/7 observation of traffic in and out of the site, precise GPS fixes of reference points for an possible attack, and even looking at the geology of the land and surrounding hills (and even excavation tailings and debris left over and deposited nearby) to have an idea what natural protection that offers to the bunker against penetrating weaponry.

Another factor is that historically, often decoy facilities have been erected, under clear view, as a diversion to mask the real facility being built somewhere. Satellites and planes can only yield a moment snapshot, and can be easily spoofed by a determined foe. If it is too easy to observe, then be suspicious about what you're actually being allowed to view.

To ease the further discussion of which types/suites of weapons systems can be deployed to strike which targets, it is useful to define several broad target categories:

Type Buried (TB): This target set consists of one or more bunkers buried in the ground. Usually such facilities are constructed in an open pit manner, with the completed facilities are (reburied) covered by a more or less thick layer of earth (but which can include special layers, e. g. gravel, sand and other coarse/fine materials in alternating layers with the object of defending against any direct attack with bombs and/or missiles. In any case, in the age of satellites, any such construction can be regularly observed, progress registered and analyzed. One knows the dimensions and exact geographic location data down to a high degree of accuracy. The defensive countermeasure layering in respect to number, type and vertical distribution of these layers is also known.

TB bedrock (TBbr): These special but very interesting subgroup, has a special geological aspect to it. In some cases one has thick layers of sedimentary rock/soil covering an ancient bedrock, erg. granite. This type of target property can have a great influence when the facility is attacked with a “seismic” suite of weapons.

Type Mountain (TM): In these cases, the bunker and tunnel systems have been driven into a mountain, either of a softer sedimentary type, or a hard massif. Even here, using whatever geological data of the region is available, one can surmise a great amount of intel by observing the trailings and other rubble transported out of the entrance. The sheer amount of material gives a rough estimate of the facility's volume, the type of material some of the extent inside the mountain. Further sensor suites, IR, Radar and more, can yield further details and/or corroboration

Type Bedrock (TBBR): Without naming names, there is at least one known site purported to have been excavated out or massive bedrock 10's of meters under the the aboveground surface. The main difference to the TM case would be the matter of slope. Even if there are hills, in this case should encounter much smaller slope (height gradient) than a facility build into the side of a mountain. The small difference will be very crucial in the selection of, the effectiveness of the weapons used in the attack.

Whatever type of buried facility is the target, there are several scalar constants that apply equally to all the main types enunciated above. And by closer examination, these scalar constants are actually the Achilles Heel of these facilities. Every buried facility, just like any mine, tunnel and similar facility requires: an entrance/access, energy(fuel), fresh air, water (and food), and communications just to name a few. Especially the last one, requires some external, above ground access (be it satellite telephone and/or dish/antenna farm) or a underground network (copper wire or fiber optic) that could be detected by special radars, even by a satellite in some cases.

An example can be the fresh air supply, one needs ducts for fresh air as well as for exhaust. Even a so-called closed circuit ventilation systems eventually need fresh air to replenish its supply. The number and positioning of such air vents can betray quite a bit of information about the facilities global properties. The larger the facility, the larger the number or the size (capacity) of the vents. A further example would the elevator shafts for facilities with a high degree of vertical layering.

But any comprehensive analysis, must consider a further target case not always that obvious at first blush. Anything, be an atomic bomb or a cooking pot, is a logistic chain that starts out with a mine that contains ore and energy (coal) and that then is processed. Then comes the manufacture and distribution elements of this chain. To overwork this metaphor, the chain is only as strong as its weakest link, thus even thought an element or even several elements or this chain are buried facilities, there may be bottlenecks (weak links), where a precise intervention can cause the whole chain to fail with a minimum of damage and violence. Thus, for completeness in the nuclear proliferation case, one needs to consider uranium mines for those countries that possess substantial exploitable deposits. These mines can be anything from an open pit to a TB/TM case. Exactly the Saddam-Niger uranium spiel was believable at first, due to the fact that the uranium deposits in Iraq are not that large, thus requiring an external source for a major atomic program.

III. The Weapons Delivery Systems

Since no manned, special operations missions are being considered (at least publicly), the incoming munitions will be delivered aerially. The platforms used can vary from bombers, cruise missiles (sea and air launched) as well as ballistic (also sea or land launched). Considering that the warhead, to be effective, needs to be brought to bear in the actual target, a buried and perhaps well armored/fortified facility, a weapons system's ability to actually get the munitions (warhead) in the facility requires a separate analysis. Furthermore, we hope to be able to demonstrate that a new class of munitions could present not only a separate alternative, but in some scenarios, produce an auxiliary effect that enhances the performance of the other available systems when used in conjunction. Let's take a quick look at what's out there right now. Up to now, most attempts have looked at deep penetration weapons. We submit that there might be a further category, a quasi seismic-like mode, that by itself or together with the deep penetration mode, could offer an effective alternative.

A. Deep Penetration (DP): At present there seem to be at least three sub-categories of these “Bunker-Busters.

Brute Force: Here we consider the GBU-28 to be typical representative. Basically just a cannon barrel, a thick one like those of high-caliber tank and artillery guns, loaded with 2 tons of explosive. Published numbers gave a penetration of 7 meters against hardened concrete, perhaps several 10's of meters against loose soil.

Deep Digger (DP-DD): A recent article in New Scientist gives a sort review of this program, that uses a combustion apparatus to enhance the penetration of hardened bunkers. There are other schemes, such as the use of multiple shaped charges, to increase the penetration. Deep Digger has a published number of 10 meters, using 5 charges. These 50 % more penetration may sound like a lot, but will such a sophisticated system really function on the battlefield with a high reliability?

Ballistic (DPB): The alternative has an enhanced penetration capability, because the impact velocity of the “spear” is much higher. One example, highlighted in a recent Der Spiegel, involves converting submarine launched Trident D-5 rockets. Replacing their nukes with conventional warheads equipped a hardened metallic rods. Basically we have here the direct analogy with the tank case, where depleted uranium rods penetrate the tank armor and destroy it. At high velocities, these anti-tank projectiles can destroy a tank without the use of any explosive. The sheer energy of the impact causes the armor on the inside to explode (spallation), or the projectile itself splinters into shrapnel by a complete penetration. It's the velocity stupid. Besides the classical ballistic missiles, also high velocity cruise-missiles are also an alternative. The main critical factor in the case of DPBs is the fact that their “warhead” lacks an explosive/thermal component (as needs to be the case in attacks against BW and CW targets, and even nuclear cases).

Needless to say, the first two groups would benefit greatly with a highly impact velocity, since both are basically free fall weapons like your everyday iron bomb. But even a ballistic missile warhead, once it enters the atmosphere, experiences atmospheric friction, drag, that slows it down. Thus all three categories could have their effectiveness heightened by the simple act of placing a booster rocket assembly on the tail end of the system and firing shortly before impact, to increase the impact velocity and therefore the penetration efficacy.

B. The Seismic Card: This proposed system could be typified by the expressions “are we ready to rumble” or even “shake, rattle and roll”. This seismic weapon (SW) has as a model the famous “Daisy Cutter” weapon already notorious in America's last few wars. The basic weapon would consist of around 10 tons or more of high explosive, with different tamping material and/or configurations and detonation sequences for the various models in the following analysis. The “bomb” could actually be even be a simple pallet that is dropped at low altitude by transport aircraft. GPS steered parachutes would be able to guide the munition to a very precise location. We assume a previous attack has eliminated air defense as well as large caliber ground fire (i. e. flak) that could be aimed against the SWs. The basic modus operandi of this class is to cause powerful shock waves in the surrounding soil/rock; with an intelligent tamping and designed sequenced firing geometry of the charge, the wave can even be, to some extent, directionally steered. Three major possibilities for the deployment of these present themselves.

The Thumper (SW-T): Assume, as a simple prototype example, the following target suite, a buried, square bunker, heavily armored with even special layers of alternating materials to defeat any DPs. By placing four (or more) SW-T charges at the correct location near the bunker, and simultaneous denotation, one can hit the bunker on all sides with a shock wave that even heightens its effect as the pairs of waves meet and exert a secondary stress on the bunker structure. Even though a bunker is hardened, and the equipment inside is set up to resist violent shaking, very sensitive large scale systems (e. g. computer and even plumping) are still very vulnerable. Enough of a jolt can cause even a well protected array of cascading ultra centrifuges to self-destruct. Using a naval analogy, the bunker is the submarine and Thumper is the “depth charge”. Also, the explosions will destroy or at worst incapacitate any external resources connected to the bunker.

A further case for SW-T becomes interesting if one has a TBbr situation. Here one could use 8 charges. The extra four are placed relative to the other four, such that these are detonated first and their shock wave, reflected by the bedrock, will reach the bunker from below, just as the shock waves of the other four, hit the sides and top. Literally, a shake, rattle and roll – we will rock you case. Also depending upon the geology of the area, sand and other loose aggregates could momentarily liquefy as the waves pass, causing the structure to suddenly sink or be stressed beyond their design parameters.

Even if the facility isn't completely destroyed in this cases, the induced damage can incapacitate the facility, the duration of which will vary from case to case. Perhaps, in that time, a diplomatic solution becomes feasible, then the hardest part of such as well as war itself, is finding a way of ending it.

The Plow (SW-P): In this case, with a different tamping and fusing sequence that directs the blast, anywhere from one to several SWs can be deployed against a single target/complex with the aim of creating a gigantic downward shock wave, that could already destroy some less well hardened targets. On the other hand, the crater caused by such an explosion would allow a second wave of munitions of the DP type could be deployed since large amounts of material have been removed and other armoring countermeasures of the target have been destroyed or functionally impaired.

In the case of a TBBR target, the Plow could even be equipped with a bottom layer of the same penetrators proposed in the DPB case, or even ball bearings of the same material. As the detonation proceeds, the penetrators in conjunction with the shock (wave riders) break up the bedrock and scatter the pieces. Conceivable is even that in this manner cracks are caused that could even extend down to the bunker. A subsequent DP attack could then finish the bunker off.

The Blaster (SW-B): Assuming that your intel efforts have discovered air intake/exhaust vents and/or entrances to shafts leading to the facility. Placing one or more SWs over half of the air vents, one could “blast right through”. The shock wave would demolish the interior of the facility. Similar effects are possible. Depending on the size of the SW, only blast doors designed for the nuclear case will be able to withstand the blast. The basic mechanism is the same as the original fuel-air explosive “Daisy Cutter”, but now directed into a void/space instead of causing a shock wave that propagates on the surface. This might be the best way to attack a TM class target.

In any case, one needs to remember, that most of these systems concentrate on penetrating the bunker, but depending on the kind of facility, a simple explosive device will not do. And in the DPB case there is no real warhead, its all just kinetic energy, the same as when a car crashes into a wall.

IV. Warheads

Since we're discussing WMDs, that means that the bunkered facilities to be attacked are of the NBC group (Nuclear, Biological or Chemical). The basic problems, destruction or denial of utilization, through the use of an appropriate munition is such that each member of this NBC group has their own problems and considerations. Often we'll treat the BC case as a single entity and give the most consideration to the nuke case.

A. Explosive Warheads: Explosive here means just plain regular explosive charges. The basic destructive mechanism is the blast wave that rips everything apart. And there lies the problem by WMDs. If the facility is chemical or nuclear, the explosion could release, locally, chemical or radioactive contamination, if the explosion was confined mainly in the bunker and not caused a plume of debris that the winds could carry out of the local region. If a plume does occur, any chemical gases would eventually decay and be diluted to a level not considered dangerous. A plume of radioactivity on the other, while dilution would lower the intensity, the contamination would be a much greater lasting threat for a large region. An attack on a biological facility, is in some cases even more threatening than the nuclear case. Since the microbes are designed to survive dispersal in the atmosphere, a plume, or even a crater with the contaminating material, will be a constant threat in terms of being a constant source to spread the contamination.

B. Chemical/Thermal Warheads: In this case, the warhead charge is also of an explosive nature, but instead of having as the main mechanism, a destructive shock wave, an extremely high temperature fireball is the goal. Such a fireball can easily cause as much if not even more destruction than the normal explosive; but has the added feature, due to the extreme temperatures achieved, that chemical bonds are broken and microbes and organic material is destroyed/sterilized. The charges best known up to now are such things as Napalm, fuel-air explosives and even the old railroad track patching rust plus aluminum powder. Then there are other possibilities, e. g. a staged detonation of something like concentrated hydrogen peroxide and phosphorous together with liquid cesium. Even a large warhead dispersing hydrofluoric acid would be an option, possessing a high degree of the ability to destroy and sterile organic materials.

For nuclear facilities, this type of charge could spread more destruction in a larger volume of the bunker, but no nuclear material would be destroyed, only diluted and dispersed. With some or very much effort, these materials could later be recovered. The effect would only be temporal in nature.

C. Nuclear Warheads: Listening to some US administration members talk, one gets the impression that for them, nukes are a type of one size fits all problems solution. But are they a good alternative, the Germans have a wonderful way of answering these type of questions, with a “jein” (ja-yes+nein-no=jein). Nukes only make sense, if that isn't an oxymoron, under 4 simultaneous conditions: (1)there's just no other alternative, really!, (2) the warhead is small enough, and only one is used, no salvos for 99.44% certainty!, (3) be sure that the warhead will penetrate, enter into the bunker and detonate inside it!, and (4) please, intel people, be damn sure there actually is a WMD bunker and not somebody's wine cellar!

The main problem with nukes, from an operative stand point, many of the national leaders like to ignore. There's the collateral damage, in this case the radioactive plume that will contaminate, only God knows how much of an area. But a nuke is still an explosive device, albeit with sterilizing heat and radiation that comes with it (for the BC case). But its no guarantee that everything will be sterile that flies out as ejecta from the explosion. The neutrons will help in the case of a nuclear facility to transmute and/or fission some of the nuclear material deposited at the site. These stocks will be rendered useless as an easy source of material to recover for further efforts by the opponent.

Dirty(Radioactive) Warheads: These types of warheads are not the exclusive domain of the terrorists. A case can be made to use these class of warhead, to avoid crossing the even more deadly threshold of the pure nuke device, either fission or fusion. Needless to say, these versions would not be that that terrorists might envision, using whatever material is available. In this case, tailor made versions would be prepared. The radioactive material can be incorporated in to the casing of an explosive charge, or as a lining between the explosive charge and the outer casing. As a small selection of what we mean, consider the following cases:

Biological: Here the additional dirty charge is made up of highly radioactive materials that emit gamma radiation and/or neutrons. The explosion would spread a cloud of radioactive dust that would destroy and sterilize any organic material from ruptured containments.

Chemical: In this case, a dirty bomb only makes limited sense in special cases. One would be where there are large stocks of chemical material in solid or liquid form. The warhead charge would consist of highly radioactive versions of the elements present in the chemical stocks. This radioactive pollution would be a type of denial of access to the opponent's chemical weapon stocks.

Nuclear: Here a dirty bomb makes the most sense against facilities such as mines, chemical conversion and enrichment facilities, where large stocks of the basic material is held in larger containers. Cesium is an element that is liquid at room temperature, and much as Mercury, easily combines with elements to form amalgam type alloys. Make an alloy of highly radioactive Cs combined with any one of the Trans-Uranium elements and use this for the dirty casing (CsTU). This will contaminate the nuclear material in the bunker and make its further processing highly dangerous if not even impossible. This contaminated material would, if used for bombs, have the danger that it would blow up in the aggressor's (or terrorist's) hands before he reaches his target.

Now we need to examine, by choosing a small selection of scenarios and see how all these considerations up to now, come together to form a viable game-plan.

V. The Scenarios

The number of cases to be discussed are going to be kept small. While theoretically a biological weapon could eventually wipe out the whole planet, an initial biological or chemical attack would not cause as many initial casualties as a powerful nuclear blast would. Also, mushroom clouds just are much scarier in the collective memory. Thus, we'll examine three different nuclear scenarios for stopping and/or impeding nuclear proliferation.

Going back to a series of preprints/publications I wrote in 1989, that examined the possibilities for verification of WMDs. In the second part of the series, I examined the logistics chains for NBC weapons production was examined with an eye to “choke points” or “bottle necks” if you so like. What is valid choke point for verification is at the same time the primary candidate as a targets for an attack against such a logistics chain. With a minimum of munitions and violence (i. e. collateral damage), you can cause a maximum of disruption. One will never be able to completely, completely destroy an rogue country's ability to pursue WMDs, but causing delays and denying access to or functioning of the facilities can buy valuable time. Time for, eventually, cooler heads to prevail; after all it actually happened in Libya.

The most dangerous proliferation states are those that possess their own Uranium deposits. They have the potential to eventually possess the complete logistics chain from mine to the actual warhead. A prime example is Iraq. Even though the country has Uranium deposits, the best were near the Kurdish area, and the amount of ore is small. Exactly this situation, that Saddam needed outside resources, made the Niger nonsense at first blush credible.

Scenario I – Mining and Benefaction: One of the best areas to stop a logistics chain is right at the beginning. The mines can be the conventional underground type with shafts, elevators and ventilation facilities coupled with a power plant to provide the energy for the operations. Some mines, though, are the open pit variety and present a different case.

Underground: After having eliminated the air defense assets, one would initially attack the mine by deploying a myriad of small flying and/or crawling insectoids (miniature robots – see the article published in the 90's in Jane's International Defence Review), each carrying a small amount of explosive laced with radioactive CsTU, to contaminate the ore shafts with radioactivity and hinder any further mining. These could enter via the entrance shaft as well as the ventilation ducts. Soon after the successful deployment of the “dirty” insectoids, the area could be carpeted with an array of conventional SW-T/P bombs, causing the collapse of the shafts. Afterwards, regular iron bombs, via aerial bombers or cruise-missiles could eliminate any surface infrastructure left. The “dirty” part of the attack would effectively be buried and entombed, with no danger to the surrounding environment unless mining activity is restarted.

Open Pit: This case is really fairly simple, regular bombardment can destroy/damage the mine, such that a major effort to reinstate operation would be necessary. The repair process could be easily observed by aerial and space intel assets. Since a physical occupation of the site is usually not an option, a “dirty” CsTU option might be considered, to hinder or completely block resumption of the mining effect.

Benefaction: Since most ore bodies have relatively low concentrations of the desired element/metal, the ore is treated in a myriad of ways, to produce a concentrated material with a much higher concentration of the desired final metal. This facility is usually fairly close to the mine head. If the facility is above or below ground, the basic manner in dealing with it would be normal explosives and, perhaps, a CsTU poisoning.

Scenario 2 – Refinement and Intermediates: The next choke point is the facility where the the actual metal is won and purified. The then extremely pure, refined product is converted to a compound that can be feed into the centrifuges for enrichment to bomb concentration levels. There is a sufficient amount of information in the public domain, citing how difficult and tricky the conversion process is, and how easily problems are caused. But as an example, a recent article in Science mentions that the Iranian Uranium has a nasty impurity, that of Molybdenum (Mo), that causes problems when the converted compound is feed into the centrifuges. Both metals are refractory types (i. e. high melting temperatures). The impurity could “precipitate” out in the centrifuges, causing clogging of the piping and imbalances that can cause the centrifuge to self-destruct, much like a spin cycle in a washer with a very badly balanced load. In both types of facilities, normal bombardment would be sufficient. A CsTU isn't really necessary, since the amounts of material in this segment of the pipeline is very limited, in contrast to the mine case.

Scenario 3 – Enrichment: Here a facility that does the actual enrichment of Uranium form less than 1% to a level in excess of 80%, is liable to be the best buried, armored and defended site in the whole logistics chain. Understandable, since this type of site is any proliferation chain's Achilles Heel. The facility has 10s of thousands of centrifuges, each being an extremely delicate apparatus, rotating with an unbelievable high velocity, that the slightest vibration can cause a veritable self-destruction orgy. For this reason, the giant assembly is placed upon a special floor/pedestal, isolated from the rest of the structure, such that even a supposed major earthquake wouldn't “rattle” the facility. Most wargames and plans up to now call for a DP attack, possibly even with nukes at their tip. This might not be even necessary (the nuke part at least). These centrifuges are machines with components machined to incredibly exact tolerances, and not manufactured in large numbers very easily, even for the highly industrialized nations.

Instead of an overkill using nukes, we would propose using a variation of the SW-T/P with a second wave of DP tipped with regular warheads. The centrifuges under such a hammering will probably have rendered the facility full of high velocity shrapnel scrap, after the centrifuges blew apart. A new facility would be years in the making and could be observed from above.

Again referring to the famous unnamed country, it has been reported that they have had substantial problems halting/winding down their centrifuges, causing very many to quasi self-destruct. If the authorities at the site were to believe that the site is about to be attacked, a fail-safe plan could entail them shutting down the facility (if the centrifuges are running) as fast as possible to avert that a hit might cause partial damage and the whole suite of centrifuges become shrapnel. But if the shut-down is too clumsy, they could end up doing the job themselves. Feigning an attack, dropping sand sacks, could do the job without getting anybody (or many) killed.

VI. Conclusion

A famous man once said something to the effect that there no easy nor good solutions to difficult situations, just the choice of a less bad. And contrary to the delusional beliefs of certain people at the head of a superpower, nothing, but nothing on this planet is simply black or white.

Any military attack will leave the facilities only more or less damaged. You can never destroy a facility completely, a la Carthage as the Romans did, without physically occupying the site. Machinery can be replaced, structures can be repaired/rebuilt, all only a question of money and time. But the time won, that time can be decisive, leaving a chance for saner minds to later gain control of the political situation.

A careful analysis of the proliferation scenarios demonstrates that there are viable options that do not necessitate nor entail the use of nukes. Some, such as the use of the CsTU card may be actually very distasteful, but used in a precise, controlled and sparingly manner, this option is still much better than the collateral damage that would be caused by a nuclear strike (with a salvo of nukes). Needless to say, after many years, after perhaps a regime change, help to cleanup the effects of the CsTU card would be a moral imperative.

There are cases in history, where permanent diplomatic solutions were not possible. The opponent using the time won to prepare for the next attack. Thus, eventually we may well be faced with a foe that leaves no other alternative, than to go nuclear. But not with a predisposition and prejudice against the diplomatic possibilities as has been apparent in the latest war. How goes the saying, “fools rush in where ......”.